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In recent decades, for-profi t provision of social care—care for 
children, the elderly and people with disabilities—has increased, 
particularly in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.1 
Th is growth has precipitated much debate about the role of for-profi t 
organisations in providing care, because for-profi t provision of care 
seems to involve a clash of images, values and interests. Th e pursuit 
of ‘fat-trimming’ cost effi  ciency by self-interested shareholders seems 
to fi t ill with the image of care as other-oriented service to those in 
need. Th at said, the rising cost of and demand for social care services 
does seem to demand mechanisms that contain costs and promote 
innovation—mechanisms many economists and policy-makers 
believe that markets best supply. Th is paper explores theoretical de-
bates about the compatibility of profi ts and care, to document the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of for-profi t provision of care. 
A brief survey of evidence from several social care fi elds attempts to 
establish the actual strengths and weaknesses of care as enterprise. 
Two main policies have facilitated growth in for-profi t provision of 
social care services in OECD countries in recent years: vouchers or 
1 Choosing a collective term for these services is not straightforward. In Australia, 
the term ‘community services’ was used to classify offi  cial statistics on such activities 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993; 2001), but has recently been replaced by two 
terms, ‘residential care services’ and ‘social assistance services’ (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2006). Our preferred alternative, ‘social care’ is more commonly used in 
the United Kingdom, and includes both these domains of practice. See Kendall and 
colleagues (2006) for an extensive defi nition. 
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rebates to individuals seeking care services, and government con-
tracting (Gilbert 2005). Th ese policy changes have taken place in the 
context of expanding demand for paid care and an ideological back-
lash against public provision, particularly in liberal welfare states.
Policies that allocate cash, vouchers or rebates to individuals bolster 
consumers’ purchasing power and choice, in turn creating opportu-
nities for (subsidised) profi t that attract private providers of social 
care services. In Australian child care, for example, the extension of 
fee relief to users in the early 1990s allowed the number of child care 
places and the for-profi t sector to expand, with for-profi t growth 
compounded by the removal of operating subsidies for competing 
non-profi t, community-based long day care centres in 1996 (Bren-
nan 2007). Similarly in the United States, tax credits combined with 
reduced federal regulation in the 1980s stimulated growth in for-
profi t child care. Chain-affi  liated for-profi ts targeted the middle and 
upper income families benefi ting from tax credits, while obtaining 
advantages by lowering staff -child ratios and salaries in response to 
deregulation (Tuominen 1991, p. 461). 
For-profi t provision of social care services has also been stimulated 
by government contracting, as governments have sought either to 
privatise public services or to expand service provision without ex-
panding the public sector. Th e typical mode of contracting in the 
social care fi eld is purchaser-provider arrangements, which aim 
to create arms-length market-type relations by separating public 
funding from service provision. Under these arrangements public 
purchasing decisions are based on provider performance, and so are, 
ideally, neutral to ownership or providers’ organisational form. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the NHS and Community Act (1990) 
facilitated both growth in domiciliary care and growth in for-profi t 
providers, as local authorities increasingly contracted with private 
organisations (Scourfi eld 2006). In the United States, the sweeping 
reforms to income support programs under the Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996 included 
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provisions that made for-profi ts eligible to contract for an expanded 
range of associated services, including welfare case management, 
children’s services, mental health, and residential or outpatient care 
(Dias & Maynard-Moody 2006; Gibelman & Demone 2002).
Mapping the territory 
Our aim is to investigate what might be specifi c about the dynamics 
and consequences of care delivered in particular relationships and in-
stitutional settings, namely care provided by paid workers employed
Figure 2.1: For-profit paid care: mapping the territory 
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by for-profi t organisations. Before we begin to examine the arguments 
and evidence about for-profi t paid care, we need to defi ne our focus by 
establishing some key conceptual distinctions (see Figure 2.1). 
First, as many theorists of care and care work have noted, the concept 
of care is complex. One reason is its diverse meanings in ordinary 
language, as a noun to denote both activities (such as nurturance) 
and feelings (such as worry and aff ection), and as the related verbs 
to care for (one’s hair, spouse, friends) and to care about (one’s ap-
pearance, children, students, or world poverty). Researchers on care 
work usually defi ne care more narrowly; England and colleagues, for 
example, defi ne it as ‘a face-to-face service that develops the capa-
bilities of the recipient’ (2002, p. 455). But even on this more narrow 
defi nition, which clearly excludes the personal toilette and political 
commitments, social policy analysts need to distinguish ‘care-giv-
ing’ to people who are dependent, from ‘servicing’ those who could 
otherwise perform the relevant activities themselves (see Wærness 
1984). Our focus is on care, defi ned as services that promote the 
capabilities of recipients who are unable to provide those services 
for themselves.
Complexities remain. Th e kind of care we focus on is practised in a 
range of relationships, including natural (parent and child), chosen 
(friend and friend), professional (teacher and student), commercial 
(employee and customer), or mandated (statutory social worker and 
foster child). In all of these relationships, money may or may not 
change hands between the carer and cared-for2 so we need to make 
some further distinctions, of which the fi rst is between unpaid and 
2 Even parents are sometimes paid for caring for their children under, for example, 
personal care assistant schemes that provide cash to people with disabilities to 
purchase care from whomever they please, including family members. Indeed, 
some forms of home child care payments can be understood as ‘payments for care’ 
to parents of able-bodied children. Meanwhile, in many paid care interactions, a 
third party pays for the care services provided to the recipient: nurses are typically 
employed by hospitals, not patients, for example. Th e carer is paid, but not by the 
recipient. 
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paid care. Although unpaid and paid care share many features (see 
Himmelweit 1999), they also diff er (Meagher 2006), and our interest 
is in paid care. Th eorists of paid care have debated whether paying 
for care will ‘crowd out’ carers’ altruistic motivation (England 2005; 
Folbre & Nelson 2000; Nelson 1999). One persuasive claim to emerge 
from this debate is that the eff ect of payment on motivation depends 
on whether payment is perceived as controlling or acknowledging 
careworkers’ intrinsic orientation towards care. Writing about nurs-
es, Nelson and Folbre argue that, in the fi rst case, ‘overly regimented 
work and payment structures … can, indeed, lead to reduced feeling 
of vocation’ (2006, p. 129). In the second, they argue, ‘If high pay is 
given in such a way that nurses feel respected and rewarded for their 
care and professionalism, feelings of vocation can be reinforced and 
expanded’ (2006, p. 129). 
Th ese arguments are about how individuals respond to payments, 
but they make clear reference to the impact of institutional or or-
ganisational arrangements on how payment aff ects carer motivation. 
And care work takes place in many institutional settings, including 
families, community networks, non-profi t agencies, fee-for-service 
arrangements, corporations, and public institutions. It is reasonable 
to conjecture that the impact of institutional structure and practice 
on the organisation, experience and practice of care might diff er sys-
tematically between these institutions. We are particularly interested 
in any diff erence that for-profi t institutional structure and practice 
might make to the quality and experience of care for both workers 
and recipients. 
Defi ning precisely what we mean by ‘for-profi t’ is important, because 
all sorts of arrangements in which money changes hands for care 
have been labelled as ‘commodifi cation’ or ‘marketisation’ of care 
(see, for example, Ungerson 1997), and these terms easily blur with 
the more specifi c concept of for-profi t provision. Production for 
profi t involves the systematic creation of a revenue stream from pri-
vate capital ownership. Th is revenue is distributed to capital owners, 
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who have an interest in the revenue being as large as is sustainable.3 
In competitive markets, private fi rms stay profi table by using the 
resources they have at their disposal, including labour, in the most 
productive ways possible. As we shall see in the following section, 
both its champions and critics respectively emphasise what they see 
as the benefi ts and risks of the dynamic process of production for 
profi t. For-profi t organisations take two primary forms—owner-op-
erated fi rms, typically on a small scale; and corporations, in which 
ownership and management are separated, and ownership may be 
dispersed among many shareholders. Some evidence suggests that 
in the social care fi eld, at least, these two types of for-profi t organisa-
tions may operate quite diff erently (Morris 1999). 
A fi nal distinction we need to make is one between actual for-profi t 
organisations (fi rms), and the extension of the discourses and prac-
tices of for-profi t organisations into the public and third sectors, 
without necessarily changing their ownership structures. Th is exten-
sion has been a key element of the ‘New Public Management’, along 
with actual privatisation and the growth of a for-profi t social care 
sector. Our focus is on actual private sector organisations—although 
as we shall see, there is debate about whether it really makes a diff er-
ence if organisations are ‘actual’ or ‘discursive’ private businesses. 
Profit and care: arguments for and against
Arguments for for-profit paid care 
Both moral and economic arguments for private, for-profi t provision 
of paid care exist, and both kinds of arguments share an assumption 
that care is like any other good or service, best—or at least not 
harmed by being—produced and distributed through markets. 
3 Th eories of the origin of profi t are notoriously controversial in economics, both 
orthodox and heterodox. However, most economists would agree that fi rms seek to 
maximise profi t.
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Proponents of the moral value of markets see anonymous, profi t-
motivated market exchanges to have ‘civilising’ potential, as they 
encourage the moral virtues of effi  ciency and enterprise, and promote 
social order through cooperation among strangers (Fourcade & 
Healy 2007, p. 304). From this perspective, the pursuit of profi t is an 
intrinsic human freedom, with private exchanges perceived to off er 
autonomy and choice to both producers and consumers (Dowding 
& John n.d.). 
More commonly, proponents of for-profi t provision draw arguments 
from economic rather than moral theory. Arguments about the eco-
nomic benefi ts of for-profi t care focus on three areas: for-profi ts’ 
incentives to effi  ciency, innovation and growth; the responsiveness 
and sustainability of private investment compared with government 
borrowing or charitable donations; and the capacity of for-profi ts to 
complement non-profi t and government activity. 
First, orthodox theories of the market treat profi t as the reward for 
effi  cient and eff ective production. Competition for profi t share is 
thought to fi lter out ineffi  cient or low quality providers and drive 
costs down. Th e pursuit of profi t can also be argued to promote 
innovation, with competition requiring providers to specialise in 
response to consumer preferences (Le Grand 1998). Further, profi t 
can provide incentives for growth, with growth leading to further 
cost advantages (and benefi ts for consumers) through economies of 
scale like collective purchasing and fl exible deployment of resources 
(including labour) across sites (Davis 1993; Holden 2005). 
Second, for-profi t provision can be argued to overcome constraints 
on government and non-profi t performance and resourcing. Unlike 
public providers, for-profi ts operate at arms length from political 
processes, so can focus completely on cost and quality (Le Grand 
1998). For-profi ts also have freer access to sources of investment. 
Private investment is argued to be more sustainable and responsive 
than government borrowing, private donation or sponsorship, off er-
ing a way to reduce the cost of government where this is a political 
goal (Le Grand 1998; Pearson & Martin 2005). 
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A third set of economic arguments highlight roles for private pro-
viders in mixed markets, on the basis that for-profi ts can supplement 
and complement government and non-profi t activity. For-profi ts 
may play a supplementary or ‘gap fi lling’ role, by off ering diff erent 
products to non-profi ts, and operating in separate market niches 
(Abzug & Webb 1999). For-profi ts may also play a complementary 
role, comfortably co-existing with (or even enhancing) government 
or non-profi t agencies, where they are operated as subsidiaries and 
can subsidise their ‘parent’ organisations’ social missions (Salaman 
1999). Alternatively, for-profi ts may comfortably co-exist with other 
organisations under quasi-market arrangements, by competing 
with non-profi ts to deliver services on behalf of governments, and 
complying with government regulation (Le Grand 1998). 
Arguments against for-profit paid care
Unlike arguments for for-profi ts, which treat care as a generic 
product, critics frame care as a social good with general benefi ts for 
the economy and society, and focus on the relational characteristics 
that diff erentiate care from other activities and products. As well 
as the physical activities of ‘caring for’, care work involves ways of 
feeling and regarding another, with human virtues of aff ection, 
commitment, intimacy, and attentiveness argued to produce a sense 
of support and wellbeing in others (Lynch 2007; Stone 2005). As 
we noted above, critics argue that marketisation has a corrosive 
impact on these moral and emotional dimensions of care, seen 
as essential for human fl ourishing. A subset of arguments against 
marketisation or commodifi cation relates specifi cally to the impact 
of for-profi t provision on the organisation, practice and experience 
of care services. In many of these arguments, moral and economic 
dimensions are inextricably linked. 
Objections to for-profi ts highlight problems of ineffi  ciency, poorer 
quality, inequity and lack of accountability. First, profi t is seen as a 
poor economic incentive for achieving social goals. Care is a public 
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good, better produced and distributed according to human need 
than skewed by investors’ self-interest (Schmid 2001). Critics raise 
concerns that because for-profi ts are controlled by owners of capital, 
provision will be guided by expectations of investment returns, so 
will be ‘auctioned to the highest bidder’ rather than guided by social 
needs or priorities. For-profi ts will gravitate to the most profi table 
end of the market, the impact being to ‘cream’ the least disadvantaged 
clients, to divert resources from the neediest needy people to (not 
needy) shareholders, and to crowd out the pursuit of collective goals 
(Gibelman & Demone 2002). In addition, for-profi ts may routinely 
under-serve or maintain ‘excess demand’ to stabilise high occupancy 
or placement rates, and to elevate prices and profi ts (Davis 1993). 
Second, it is not clear that, in the end, private provision is actually 
effi  cient, since governments oft en need to off er citizens signifi cant 
fi scal incentives to take up private services, and the cost of these 
incentives may be so large as to eliminate the fi scal gains of reducing 
direct expenditure in the fi rst place (Pearson & Martin 2005, p. 31).
Other critics question the ‘trustworthiness’ of for-profi ts where 
markets are imperfect. Care recipients do not fi t the model of fully 
rational consumers able to exercise choice, accurately assess quality, 
choose between alternatives, and exit the market when a product fails 
to satisfy (Hirschmann 1970). Care recipients, and those purchasing 
care on their behalf can access only imperfect information, as care 
takes place over extended periods of time and is highly personal, 
making it diffi  cult (and expensive) to monitor quality (Folbre & 
Nelson 2000). Th is raises risks that opportunistic for-profi ts will 
exploit consumers’ inability to fully monitor services by charging 
high prices but skimping on those aspects of quality which consumers 
fi nd diffi  cult to observe and respond to (Hirth 1997, p. 419; Morris 
& Helburn 2000). Th at is, for-profi ts may ‘sell low-quality care as if it 
were of high quality’ (Morris 1999, p. 142). Compounding this, for-
profi ts lack organisational values and social missions against which 
they can be held to account (and which off er symbolic assurance of 
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quality); and they have less thorough public reporting requirements 
and democratic accountability, and may shy from evaluation of their 
outcomes (Gibelman & Demone 2002, p. 395). 
Another set of arguments highlights the supposedly negative 
implications of growth. Pursuing profi t exposes care services to 
speculative investment as well as mergers and takeovers, processes 
which risk reducing the competition supposed to keep service 
provision effi  cient, and exposing care provision to the possibility 
of collapse (Scourfi eld 2007; Salaman 1999). Profi t-seeking growth 
also increases the dominance of chains which, controlled by off -site 
management and shareholders, are seen as more aggressive profi t-
maximisers than smaller, independent for-profi ts (Morris 1999). 
Further, increased concentration may make care markets diffi  cult to 
regulate, as large profi t-seeking providers can entrench their interests 
by infl uencing regulation and shaping the terms of the market (see 
Press & Woodrow 2009; Scourfi eld 2007). 
A fi nal set of arguments against for-profi ts highlights working 
conditions and the organisation of work. Crucial here is the idea 
that ‘profi table care’ and ‘quality care’ confl ict. Workers are the 
major determinants of care quality—and the major component of 
costs. Because care involves relationship-building, any increases in 
productivity will reduce quality (Morris 1999; Himmelweit 2007). 
Quality declines as the need to minimise costs causes for-profi ts 
to circumscribe the time available for the relationship-building at 
the heart of good care. Th e risk here is that ‘caring’ motivation (a 
guarantee of quality and eff ectiveness) will be squeezed out, with 
care instead performed ‘lovelessly’, impersonally and to minimum 
standards (King 2007, p. 203; Folbre & Nelson 2000). As Lynch puts it: 
When a “care” relationship is set within a system of social 
relations focused on profi t or gain in particular, it is self-
evident that the care dimension of this relationship is likely to 
be either precluded, subordinated, or made highly contingent 
on the profi t-margins expected (2007, p. 563). 
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For-profi ts’ imperative to minimise costs places pressure on labour, 
lowering staff -to-client ratios, wages, skills, training and professional 
development, and contributing to problems in recruiting and 
retaining staff  (Schmid 2001). Profi t also provides an incentive to 
produce those more physically visible, measurable aspects of care, 
which are easiest to clearly codify in contracts to be bought and 
sold. Th e main consequence is reduced professional discretion and 
therapeutic work in for-profi ts and a tendency to squeeze out those 
more fl uid interpersonal aspects of labour processes which seem to 
yield few tangible results, like attentiveness and friendship, and, at 
an organisational level, participation of workers and consumers in 
decision-making (Scourfi eld 2007; Schmid 2001). 
Arguments that for-profit status doesn’t matter
A third set of arguments holds that organisational form matters little 
to care. Some we have already canvassed treat the involvement of 
money, not profi ts per se as the key problem for care provision (Stone 
2005), so that many of the organisations included in Figure 2.1, not 
just for-profi ts, would engender the same problems. Th is is because, 
as Stone puts it, paying for care compels third-party purchasers to 
‘count it, monitor it, defi ne it, and limit it’ (2005, p. 282–83), and to 
prioritise the physical acts or ‘doing’ of care over the less tangible 
‘being’ of care. In this frame, it is not (only) the pursuit of profi ts, but 
paying for care, contracting for care, and bureaucratising care that 
risks reducing care to mundane, physical, measurable elements. 
By contrast, some analysts see concerns about for-profi t status as 
exaggerated. Th ey claim that real world markets and organisations 
do not operate according to the competitive and profi t-maximising 
ideal, but instead involve complex social relationships and 
institutions, and the profi t motive can be bounded and controlled 
(Folbre & Nelson 2000). Some feminist economists, for example, 
have questioned dualisms between self-interested behaviour in 
supposedly impersonal markets, and virtuous motivation in the non-
market sphere, pointing out for-profi t provision can embody a range 
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of values and strategies (Folbre & Nelson 2000; Nelson & England 
2002). Some for-profi ts may pursue only small profi ts alongside 
social goals rather than being driven by ‘fi nancial gain above all 
else’ (Nelson & England 2002, p. 5). Th ese arguments suggest it is 
how care services are delivered, not the ownership structure of the 
delivering organisation, that matters most. As motivations for care 
are complex and layered, the pursuit of profi t will not, inevitably, 
squeeze moral virtue or quality out of care.
Another set of arguments highlights pressures towards organisational 
‘isomorphism’ which obviate the diff erences between organisations 
with diff erent ownership structures (Estes & Swan 1994). Some 
emphasise the importance of institutional networks, and their 
structure, over ownership (Perry 1998, p. 414; Le Grand 1998). 
On this view, government contracting can neutralise diff erences 
in for-profi t and non-profi t behaviour, with regulation and quasi-
market competition driving providers both to mimic each other 
and to emulate the government agencies on which they depend (see 
also Estes & Swan 1994, p. 279). When obliged to conform to the 
same regulations and outcome standards, contractors, regardless of 
organisational form, are expected to develop similar service delivery 
structures and technologies (Schmid & Nirel 2004). In this frame, 
organisations are dynamic. Rather than ownership determining 
behaviour, organisations respond to each other in competitive 
environments, and to regulation. 
Th e disability rights movement’s call for ‘nothing about us without 
us’, and for the rights of people with disabilities to live independent-
ly, also imply that ownership structure is not a critical determinant 
of service quality and access. What matters is that users ‘have choice 
over … who provides assistance and control over when and how that 
assistance is provided’ (Carmichael & Brown 2002, p. 805, emphasis 
in original).4 
4 Th anks to Helen Meekosha, who pointed this out at the workshop on ‘Social 
care for people with a disability and frail aged people: Perspectives from Australia, 
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Control may also be important to service providers as well as service 
users, and may eclipse profi t-maximising as a primary goal, par-
ticularly among small, owner-operated, for-profi t providers. When 
autonomy and a modicum of professional satisfaction replace profi t 
maximising as an organisational goal, some of the consequences 
feared by critics of the provision of care for profi t may not materialise 
(Kendall 2001; Matosevic et al. 2007; 2008). Th ese are the ‘dwarves of 
capitalism’, and suggest that when it comes to the impact of owner-
ship on services, size matters (Davidson 2009). 
Professionalism can, in theory, also play a role in reducing the diff er-
ences between for-profi t and non-profi t providers. Professionalism 
has been posited as a ‘third logic’, beside the logic of markets and 
bureaucracies (Freidson 2001, cited in Evetts 2003). On this view, 
where professionals provide services, they adhere to norms and 
practices defi ned by their occupation rather than by the organisa-
tions for which they work, regardless of ownership. Th ere are, of 
course, positive and negative views of professionalism: proponents 
see professionalism as off ering a framework for the development and 
practice of norms that support high-quality care, based on special-
ised expertise and commitment to professional ethics, while critics 
see professionalism as the paternalistic exercise of power by self-
interested members of state-sanctioned monopolies (Evetts 2003; 
Knijn & Verhagen 2007; Meagher 2006). 
Evidence from social care systems
Many arguments for and against for-profi t provision—and some 
that are indiff erent—rest on theoretical claims about ideal typical 
behaviours and organisations. Yet whether or not organisational 
form makes a diff erence to the quality and accessibility of paid 
care services is an empirical question. In this section we consider 
Scandinavia, Canada and the UK’ at the Social Policy Research Centre, University 
of New South Wales, in February 2008.
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research evidence on whether the quality of care is diff erent in for-
profi t organisations in three social care sectors: residential aged care, 
child care, and home care for the aged and people with disabilities. 
Residential aged care
With few exceptions (for example, Castle & Shea 1998), studies 
show inferior standards of quality in for-profi t residential aged care 
(Aaronson et al. 1994; Castle & Engberg 2007; Davis 1993; Harrington 
et al. 2001; Martin 2005). Staffi  ng is a consistent theme. In the United 
States, a study of over 13,000 federally regulated nursing homes 
revealed investor-owned homes had lower staffi  ng ratios than non-
profi ts or public homes, with chain ownership associated with the 
lowest levels of quality (Harrington et al. 2001). Similarly, in Canada, 
for-profi t status is associated with lower levels of staff -client contact 
than in non-profi ts, with studies showing they deliver fewer hours of 
direct nursing care (Berta et al. 2005; McGrail et al. 2007; McGregor 
et al. 2005). 
In Australia’s residential care sector, too, for-profi ts have been 
found to have fewer aged care workers per bed than non-profi ts and 
government operated facilities, higher staff  turnover, higher staff 
vacancy rates (especially for registered nurses), and higher use of 
agency staff  (Martin 2005). However, despite this discrepancy, when 
asked about various aspects of their work, such as pressure to work 
harder, ability to spend enough time with each resident, level of 
freedom to decide how to do their work, and capacity to use their 
skills, workers in non-profi t and for-profi t facilities gave very similar 
answers (King & Martin 2009).
In terms of care outcomes, for-profi ts appear to have poorer health 
outcomes. In a study of 449 nursing homes in Pennsylvania, Aaronson 
and colleagues (1994) found that residents of for-profi t homes had 
higher risks of pressure sores than residents of non-profi ts, and for-
profi ts used restraints on the elderly more oft en. Another study of 
422 hospices across the United States found that patients in for-profi t 
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facilities received a narrower range of care services than in non-profi ts, 
controlled for a range of confounding factors (Carlson et al. 2004). 
Hospitalisation rates provide further evidence of poorer outcomes of 
for-profi t nursing home care. A study of more than 43,000 residents 
of subsidised nursing homes in British Columbia (McGregor et al. 
2006) found for-profi ts had higher hospitalisation rates for some 
conditions (pneumonia, anaemia and dehydration) although 
diff erences were not signifi cant for falls, urinary tract infections or 
gangrene. In that large study, the lowest hospitalisation rates came 
from non-profi t facilities attached to a hospital or health authority 
(presumably due to their proximity to health professionals), or those 
that were multi-site, with the latter tending to be better staff ed and 
to have better access to health professionals (who may, for example, 
be shared between sites).
Other studies point to the negative impact of growth and con-
centration in the residential care sector. In the United Kingdom in 
particular, mergers and acquisitions have compounded concentration 
in aged care since the late 1990s. Th ese processes, it is argued, allow 
more aggressive profi teering, as they have shift ed political power 
from regulators to the largest for-profi ts and, in the process, have 
limited scope for choice, service user involvement and professional 
discretion (Drakeford 2006; Holden 2005; Scourfi eld 2007). 
While there is little evidence that quality standards are higher in 
private for-profi t residential care, studies into care-home providers’ 
motivations (potentially a proxy for quality) suggest ownership sta-
tus may not make a signifi cant diff erence. A series of English studies 
has found that regardless of whether they were operating as public, 
private or voluntary providers, care-home managers reported aspir-
ing to professional goals, and the desire to meet older people’s needs 
(intrinsic motivators), over any desire for personal income or profi t 
(extrinsic motivators) (Matosevic et al. 2007; 2008). Moreover, pri-
vate providers should not be assumed to be profi t-maximisers—the 
desire for autonomy and independence are also important motivators 
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among the small-business operators of care homes who participated 
in Kendall’s English study (2001). Th e fi ndings of these studies are 
interesting, but not entirely comparable with the studies we discuss 
above. One problem is that providers’ attitudes may not be a reliable 
and valid measure of service quality, because they may not directly 
translate into organisational policy and behaviour. Matosevic and 
colleagues surveyed ‘managers’ of public, voluntary non-profi t and 
for-profi t care homes, and more than a third of respondents from 
for-profi t homes were neither owners nor owner-managers. Th ese 
respondents probably worked in the corporate sector.5 How much 
scope these managers have to set organisational policies and service 
standards on the basis of their own motivations for working in aged 
care is not established. 
Child care
Studies of child care also contribute a considerable body of evidence 
to support the argument that for-profi t organisations are more likely 
to provide services of inferior quality. And like for-profi t residential 
aged care, staffi  ng and staffi  ng ratios are recurrent themes in studies 
of the quality of child care.
In a study of 325 child care centres in Canada, for example, Cleveland 
and Krashinsky (2005) found a statistically signifi cant diff erence in 
the quality of the environment and of care in for-profi t and non-
profi t centres, with for-profi t centres over-represented among poor 
quality services. However, much depends on the type of non-profi t 
or for-profi ts (with chain-affi  liated centres performing the worst), 
5 Matosevic and colleagues (2007, p. 114) gathered data from 58 homes, of which 28 
were private for-profi t, 21 were voluntary non-profi t, and nine were local-authority 
managed. Among for-profi t homes, ten were small, six were medium-sized, and 12 
were corporate. Among respondents, 40 were managers, four owners, and 14 acted 
as both manager and owner. Given the organisation types included in the sample, 
logic suggests that all eighteen of the owners and owner-managers operated in 
the for-profi t sector, mostly in small and medium homes, leaving ten non-owning 
managers of for-profi t homes, most probably in the corporate sector.
  Political economy of for-profit paid care  •  29
and on the character of licensing and regulation (Morris & Helburn 
2000). In a study of 401 centres in four representative states of the 
United States, Morris and Helburn (2000) found higher staff  ratios 
in independent and church-affi  liated non-profi ts, and in public child 
care centres, and lower ratios in those centres operated by for-profi ts, 
but also in those operated by community agencies and churches. 
Morris found for-profi ts skimp on staff  wages and qualifi cations, 
instead spending more on facilities than non-profi ts (1999, p. 138). 
As well as operating with lower staff  ratios and lower paid staff , 
there is evidence that for-profi t child care centres may be less likely 
to publicly state their staffi  ng standards. A study of 115 American 
child care centres (Gelles 2000) found that, in the absence of strong 
regulation, for-profi t centres were less likely to state their staff -child 
ratios in written advertising material (19 per cent of for-profi ts did 
compared with 44 per cent of non-profi ts). As well as failing to state 
standards against which they could be held accountable, for-profi ts 
were more likely to regroup children throughout the day, temporarily 
lowering staffi  ng ratios at the expense of stability in children’s care 
environment, and without parents’ knowledge (Gelles 2000, p. 240). 
In addition, Gelles (2000) found patterns of volunteering (which 
off ers a way for parents to monitor the centre’s internal operations) 
diff ered signifi cantly between for-profi t and non-profi t child care 
centres. Only one per cent of for-profi ts reported seven or more 
volunteer hours a week, compared with 30 per cent of non-profi ts. 
Together, these practices make it more diffi  cult to monitor for-profi t 
performance, and to hold them to account. 
Some studies explicitly test the theory that for-profi t child care 
centres are less ‘trustworthy’ than non-profi ts, exploring whether 
they will exploit consumers’ inability to accurately assess quality by 
enhancing superfi cial aspects of quality in attempts to lower cost 
without losing business (Morris 1999). Morris and Helburn (2000) 
examined whether for-profi t child care centres were more likely 
to direct eff ort to ‘easy to observe’ aspects of quality (like centre 
appearance) while skimping on supervised learning programs and 
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staff -child interactions, which involve more highly trained staff 
and higher staff -to-child ratios. Th ey confi rm that skimping on 
the hard to observe aspects of quality occurs where lower licensing 
standards allow staff  ratios and staff  training to fall (in their multi-
state study, this was in North Carolina). For-profi ts affi  liated with 
chains, in particular, were found to skimp on activities undertaken 
while parents were not present (including meals, supervision of 
creative play, supervision of fi ne motor activities, staff  cooperation 
and staff  professional development opportunities). Compared with 
independent for-profi ts, chain-affi  liated for-profi ts focused their 
eff orts more strongly on greeting and departing, personal grooming, 
furnishings, child-related displays, space, equipment, and provisions 
for parents (such as meeting areas). Community agencies also 
provided lower hard-to-observe quality for preschoolers, which the 
authors attributed to either managerial laxness or shirking where 
agencies had long contracts with government departments (Morris 
& Helburn 2000).
Further evidence of poorer performance by for-profi ts relates to 
equity, with for-profi ts found to serve smaller proportions of low-
income children and children with special needs (Cleveland & 
Krashinsky 2005; Morris & Helburn 2000). Preston (1993) also 
found that, in the absence of regulation in the United States, non-
profi ts provided services with higher levels of ‘social externalities’, 
measured in terms of service to children who were black, minority, 
or from poor or single parent families. Th at study also found lower 
levels of extra early childhood and counselling services in for-profi t 
child care centres. However, minority participation levelled where 
centres were subject to stringent regulation, although non-profi ts 
maintained advantages in terms of staff  quality and provision of 
extra early childhood services. 
Th ere is also some evidence to support the argument that size matters 
when it comes to for-profi t provision of child care (Rush 2007; Morris 
& Helburn 2000). For example, one Australian study of centre-based 
child care quality, based on a survey of 578 childcare workers, found 
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signifi cant diff erences on most main measures of service quality 
between (large) corporate chains on one hand and (small) owner-
operated for-profi t providers and non-profi t providers on the other 
(Rush 2007). 
Home care for the elderly and people with disabilities
Evidence about for-profi ts in home care is mixed, with several studies 
pointing to the potential for regulation to neutralise diff erences in 
behaviour deriving from organisational form. 
One study of 750 home care clients in Ontario (where providers are 
required to meet specifi c standards) found that, for the most part, 
there were no diff erences in the care provided by for-profi ts and non-
profi ts, although clients of for-profi ts were slightly more satisfi ed 
with their care, and had slightly better mental health outcomes than 
those of non-profi ts (Doran et al. 2007). However, other Ontario 
studies draw evidence from home care workers, showing lower 
wages and working conditions in the for-profi t sector. Aronson 
and colleagues (2004) examined the consequences of layoff s of 317 
non-profi t home care support workers in 2002, fi nding that most 
who stayed in the sector were absorbed by for-profi ts and suff ered 
deterioration in their wages and conditions. A third Ontario study 
draws evidence from 835 home care workers (Denton et al. 2007). 
Denton and colleagues identify problems of job satisfaction and staff  
turnover, but attribute this to the character of managed competition, 
which, rather than for-profi t status, they argue, reduces job security, 
erodes organisational and peer support, and shift s organisational 
values from ‘caring’ to business priorities. Th us, overarching market 
structures, which engender organisational isomorphism among 
providers with diff erent ownership structures, may de-diff erentiate 
the quality of care and work, bringing both down by ‘spreading 
the bads’ between providers of diff erent ownership status (see also 
Gustafsson & Szebehely 2009).
Researchers in the United Kingdom also emphasise the importance 
of regulatory arrangements. In a study of 155 providers in eleven 
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English local authorities, Forder and colleagues (2002) highlight how 
the type of contract between purchasers and providers, rather than 
ownership per se, infl uences how home-care organisations pursue 
profi t. Th ey found that regardless of ownership structure, recipients 
of grants (lump sums with broad service specifi cations) placed a 
lower priority on profi t-making than those engaged on contracts 
for specifi ed quantities of service, or those contracting on the basis 
of price per case. Th is adds weight to arguments that the character 
of contracts and regulation may be more important infl uences on 
organisational behaviour than ownership or organisational form. 
Th e case of home care also off ers support for arguments downplaying 
the role of ownership, showing how regulation can neutralise the 
eff ects of ownership diff erences. A ten-year longitudinal study 
examined the growth of Israeli home care services, which was 
facilitated by the introduction of social insurance contributions 
(Schmid 2001). Th at study showed government contracting caused 
the strategic, structural, administrative and human behaviour of 
for-profi ts and non-profi ts to blur. Both non-profi ts and for-profi ts 
became more dependent on government resources, adopted similar 
service technologies and similar pricing, fi nancing and marketing 
strategies, and transmitted professional norms. Professional 
communication networks minimised diff erences, and executives 
moved across sectors, transmitting policies and processes as they 
went (Schmid 2001). 
Nevertheless, Schmid (2001) found that private providers did 
perform worse than non-profi ts in the fi rst few years of contracting, 
although distinctions lessened over the decade. For-profi ts ‘caught 
up’ by establishing links with governments, adhering to standards, 
setting up quality control systems, formalising work roles and 
systems, investing more in training, and reducing staff  turnover. 
Aft er ten years, for-profi ts were virtually indistinguishable from 
non-profi ts in terms of service eff ectiveness and client satisfaction, 
causing the author to call for research and policy to focus on the key 
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problem not of who provides services, but on how care is organised 
and provided (Schmid 2001). 
British studies of the motivations of domiciliary care providers 
fi nd that they are, like the motivations of residential care providers, 
mixed, with the desire to make money co-existing with the desire 
for professional satisfaction and to help others. Th e balance between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations may diff er by ownership type, but 
so does the capacity to express intrinsic motivations, which depends 
much on the external environment. Th e researchers stress the role of 
contract specifi cation and the experience of day-to-day relationships 
with local authority purchasers in determining whether motivations 
that support high-quality care are crowded in—or out (Kendall et 
al. 2003). 
Given the theoretical potential for professionalism to support high-
quality care, Knijn and Verhagen’s (2007) study of the impact of 
payments for care on professionalism in home care off ers a further 
useful insight into the dynamic eff ects of the emergence of markets 
in home care services. Th ese researchers argue that professionalism 
in home care has been put under signifi cant pressure by one key 
method of promoting a market in home care services; viz. direct 
payments to service users. Direct payments push care out of the 
public sector, into the private domains of the family and market. In 
many European countries, for example, service users can pay family 
members to provide care. One result of this is that home care, as 
a ‘weak profession’, is poorly placed to resist perceptions that it is 
not clearly distinguishable from what family members can off er, 
more cheaply, and more warmly. Further, direct payment systems 
typically decouple public funding from public provision, opening up 
private markets for home care, markets in which pressures for cost-
cutting are strong, thereby undermining the quality of both care and 
employment in the sector. 
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Taking stock
Abstract principles from economics and moral theory are invoked by 
some participants in the debate about for-profi t care. However, the 
debate takes place in a specifi c historical context, in which several 
trends converge to create demand for paid care services and in which 
for-profi t paid care becomes one way of meeting that demand. 
Population ageing, changing family structures and increasing 
participation in the labour market by women are increasing 
demand for provision of care services outside the family. Writing 
about Western Europe, but making arguments also applicable in the 
English-speaking liberal welfare states, Fargion argues that these 
changes ‘reduce … the practical possibilities for inter-generational 
cooperation, thereby increasing the diffi  culties in the performance 
of caring functions within the primary network’ (Fargion 2000, p. 61). 
Increasing demand is expressed as increasing expectations by 
citizens that social care services will be provided in some form by 
governments. But the emergence of new care needs has coincided 
with concern that claims on the welfare state need to be constrained, 
and that the size of the public sector needs to be contained, and if 
possible, reduced. Th us, privatisation of social care has emerged 
as a solution—the institutional size of the public sector has been 
contained in English-speaking countries, while service provision 
can be expanded through public subsidies to private sector (both 
for-profi t and non-profi t) organisations. 
Because the changes that have ‘defamilialised’ informal care and 
‘privatised’ social care have been so profound and contested, it is not 
surprising that the debate about for-profi t paid care is caught up in 
wider debates about the nature of the good society. Th ese debates 
canvass questions about the appropriate scope of the market (as a 
domain of freedom or exploitation, depending on one’s point of 
view), the proper role of governments and the public sector (as an 
ineffi  cient and coercive institution or as an expression of collective 
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responsibility, again depending on one’s point of view), and the place 
of women in the public sphere. 
Th at the debate about for-profi t care refl ects broader ideological 
divides is one reason why assessment of the evidence is so crucial 
in this rather fraught fi eld of social policy. Several points stand out 
from our survey of evidence on for-profi t provision of paid care. 
First is that the weight of evidence seems to fall on the side of critics of 
for-profi t provision, particularly in residential aged care and in child 
care, and particularly in North America. However, the case against 
for-profi t provision in any and all situations is not overwhelming, 
which brings us to a second point: that the distinction between 
‘for-profi t’ and ‘non-profi t’ may be too coarse-grained. As Morris 
and Helburn (2000) show in their study of child care in the United 
States, the categories ‘for-profi t’ and ‘non-profi t’ can each include 
diff erent kinds of organisations, such that quality outcomes do not 
vary entirely systematically with auspice. Further, Shmid’s study 
of home care for the aged in Israel (2001) shows how diff erences 
between for-profi t and non-profi t services can decline over time, 
as environmental factors and organisational learning engender a 
process of institutional isomorphism. Meanwhile, professionalism is 
a set of values and practices that can be mobilised in both non-profi t 
and for-profi t settings, and so may also mitigate diff erences between 
the performance of diff erent kinds of organisations. 
Th ird is that the policy context, including regulation and contracting 
conditions, is a critical environmental factor aff ecting the 
performance of organisations providing social care. Regulation can 
put a ‘fl oor’ under the quality of care services (and care work jobs), or 
fail to do so, enabling skimping on unmeasured or hard-to-measure 
aspects of quality. Regulation can also ‘spread the bads’ in purchaser-
provider or consumer choice systems, as the dynamic consequences 
of competition play themselves out in pressures on providers to cut 
costs and to fragment and routinise care work practices. Th us, when 
the motivations of care providers include both intrinsic and extrinsic 
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elements, policy makers need to design social service systems that 
enable expression of the intrinsic motivations that support quality 
care. Th is suggests that the fate of professionalism as a normative 
and organisational framework for maintaining and improving the 
quality of care is also ultimately policy-dependent. 
Fourth, it seems that the care sector matters too. Evidence suggests 
that the impact of for-profi t organisation diff ers in home care services 
compared to institutional care services for children and the elderly 
(specifi cally centre-based child care and nursing homes). Why this 
might be is worth further investigation. 
Th ese fi ndings mean that the search for models of social care 
provision in which the quality of both care and jobs is high, and 
access to services is equitable, remains open—in wealthy, English-
speaking democracies, at any rate. Clearly, further research and 
policy experimentation are required. 
References 
Aaronson, W., Zinn, J. & Rosko, M. 1994, ‘Do for-profi t and not-for-profi t 
nursing homes behave diff erently’?, Th e Gerontologist, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 
775–86. 
Abzug, R. & Webb, N. 1999, ‘Relationships between non-profi t and for-
profi t organizations: A stakeholder perspective’, Nonprofi t and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 416–31.
Aronson, J., Denton, M. & Zeytinoglu, I. 2004, ‘Market-modelled home 
care in Ontario: Deteriorating working conditions and dwindling commu-
nity capacity’, Canadian Public Policy vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 111–25. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993, Australian and New Zealand Stan-
dard Industrial Classifi cation (ANZSIC), 1993, Cat. No. 1292.0, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, Community Services, Australia, 
1999–2000, Cat. No. 8696.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra.
  Political economy of for-profit paid care  •  37
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006, Australian and New Zealand Stan-
dard Industrial Classifi cation (ANZSIC), 2006, Cat. No. 1292.0, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
Berta, W, LaPorte, A, & Valdemanis, C. 2005, ‘Observations on institutional 
long-term care in Ontario: 1996-2002’, Canadian Journal of Aging, vol. 24, 
no. 1, pp. 70–84.
Brennan, D. 2007, ‘Th e ABC of child care politics’, Australian Journal of 
Social Issues, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 213–26.
Carlson, M., Gallo, W. & Brady, E. 2004, ‘Ownership status and patterns 
of care in hospice: Results from the National Home and Hospice Care 
Survey’, Medical Care, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 432–38. 
Carmichael, A. & Brown, L. 2002, ‘Th e future challenge for direct pay-
ments’, Disability & Society, vol. 17, no. 7, pp. 797–808. 
Castle, N. & Engberg, J. 2007, ‘Th e infl uence of staffi  ng characteristics on 
quality of care in nursing homes’, Health Services Research, vol. 42, no. 5, 
pp. 1822–47.
Castle, N. & Shea, D. 1998, ‘Th e eff ects of for-profi t and not-for-profi t fa-
cility status on the quality of care for nursing home residents with mental 
illnesses’, Research on Aging, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 246–263. 
Cleveland, G. & Krashinsky, M. 2005, Th e Quality Gap: A Study of Non-
profi t and Commercial Childcare Centres in Canada, Toronto, Child Care 
Resource and Research Unit.
Davidson, B. 2009, ‘For-profi t organisations in managed markets for hu-
man services’, in Paid Care in Australia: Politics, Profi ts, Practices, eds D. 
King & G. Meagher, Sydney University Press, Sydney.
Davis, M. 1993, ‘Nursing home ownership revisited: Market, cost and 
quality relationships’, Medical Care, vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 1062–68.
Denton, M., Zeytinoglu, I., Kusch, K. & Davies, S. 2007, ‘Market-modelled 
home care: Impact on job satisfaction and propensity to leave’, Canadian 
Public Policy, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 81–100.
Dias, J. & Maynard-Moody, S. 2006, ‘For-profi t welfare: Contracts, 
confl icts, and the performance paradox’, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Th eory, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 189–211.
38  •  Meagher & Cortis
Doran, D., Pickard, J., Harris, J., Coyte, P., Macrae, A., Laschinger, H., 
Darlington, G. & Carryer, J. 2007, ‘Th e relationship between character-
istics of home care nursing service contracts under managed competi-
tion and continuity of care and client outcomes: Evidence from Ontario’, 
Healthcare Policy, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 97–113.
Dowding, K. & John, P. n.d., ‘Th e value of choice in public policy’, [On-
line], Available: http://www.ipeg.org.uk/papers/D+J_value_of_
choice_in_public_policy290906.pdf [2008, Sep 10]. 
Drakeford, M. 2006, ‘Ownership, regulation and the public interest: Th e 
case of residential care for older people’, Critical Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 
4, pp. 932–44.
England, P. 2005, ‘Emerging theories of care work’, Annual Review of Soci-
ology, vol. 31, pp. 381–99.
England, P., Budig, M. & Folbre, N. 2002, ‘Wages of virtue: Th e relative 
pay of care work’, Social Problems, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 455–73. 
Estes, C. & Swan, J. 1994, ‘Privatization, system membership, and access 
to home health care for the elderly’, Milbank Quarterly, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 
277–98. 
Evetts, J. 2003, ‘Th e sociological analysis of professionalism: Occupational 
change in the modern world’, International Sociology, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 
395–415.
Fargion, V. 2000, ‘Timing and the development of social care services in 
Europe’, Western European Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 59–88. 
Folbre, N. & Nelson, J. 2000, ‘For love or money—Or both?’ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 123–40. 
Forder, J., Knapp, M., Hardy, B., Kendall, J., Matosevic, T, & Ware, P. 2004, 
‘Prices, contracts and motivations: Institutional arrangements in domicili-
ary care’, Policy & Politics, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 207–22.
Fourcade, M. & Healy, K. 2007, ‘Moral views of market society’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, vol. 33, pp. 285–311.
Gelles, E. 2000, ‘Th e role of the economic sector in the provision of care 
to trusting clients’, Nonprofi t Management & Leadership, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 
233–49.
  Political economy of for-profit paid care  •  39
Gibelman, M. & Demone, H. 2002, ‘Th e commercialization of health and 
human services: Neutral phenomenon or cause for concern?’ Families in 
Society: Th e Journal of Contemporary Human Services, vol. 83, no. 4, pp. 
387–97.
Gilbert, N. 2005, Th e ‘enabling state?’ from public to private responsibility 
for social protection: Pathways and pitfalls, OECD Social Employment and 
Migration Working Papers No. 26, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Gustafsson, R. Å. & Szebehely, M. 2009, ‘Outsourcing of eldercare services 
in Sweden: Eff ects on work environment and political legitimacy’, in Paid 
Care in Australia: Politics, Profi ts, Practices, eds D. King & G. Meagher, 
Sydney University Press, Sydney.
Harrington, C., Woolhandler, S., Mullan, J., Carrillo, H. & Himmelstein, 
D. 2001, ‘Does investor ownership of nursing homes compromise the 
quality of care?’, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 91, no. 9, pp. 
1452–55.
Himmelweit, S. 1999, ‘Caring labor’, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 561, pp. 27–38.
Himmelweit, S. 2007, ‘Th e prospects for caring: Economic theory and 
policy analysis’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 581–99.
Hirschmann, A. 1970, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Hirth, R. 1997, ‘Competition between for-profi t and nonprofi t health care 
providers: Can it help achieve social goals?’ Medical Care Research and 
Review, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 414–38.
Holden, C. 2005, ‘Organizing across borders: Profi t and quality in 
internationalized providers’, International Social Work, vol. 48, no. 5, pp. 
643–53. 
Kendall, J. 2001, ‘Of knights, knaves and merchants: Th e case of residential 
care for older people in England in the late 1990s’, Social Policy & 
Administration, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 360–75.
Kendall, J., Matosevic, T., Forder, J., Knapp, M., Hardy, B. & Ware, P. 2003, 
‘Th e motivations of domiciliary care providers in England: New concepts, 
new fi ndings’, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 489–511. 
40  •  Meagher & Cortis
Kendall, J., Knapp, M., & Forder, J. 2006, ‘Social care and the non-profi t 
sector in the Western developed world’, in Th e Nonprofi t Sector: A Re-
search Handbook, eds W. Powell & R. Steinberg, Yale University Press, 
New Haven. 
King, D. 2007, ‘Rethinking the care-market relationship in care provider 
organisations’, Australian Journal of Social Issues, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 
199–212.
King, D. & Martin, B. 2009, ‘Caring for-profi t? Th e impact of for-profi t 
providers on the quality of employment in paid care’, in Paid Care in 
Australia: Politics, Profi ts, Practices, eds D. King & G. Meagher, Sydney 
University Press, Sydney.
Knijn, T. & Verhagen, S. 2007, ‘Contested professionalism: Payments for 
care and the quality of home care’, Administration & Society, vol. 39, no. 4, 
pp. 451–75.
Le Grand, J. 1998, ‘Ownership and social policy’, Th e Political Quarterly, 
vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 415–21.
Lynch, K. 2007, ‘Love labour as a distinct and non-commodifi able form of 
care labour’, Sociological Review, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 550–70.
Martin, B. 2005, Residential aged care facilities and their workers: how staff -
ing patterns and work experience vary with facility characteristics, National 
Institute of Labour Studies, Flinders University. 
Matosevic T., Knapp, M., Kendall, J., Henderson, C. & Fernández, J. 2007. 
‘Care home providers as professionals: Understanding the motivations of 
care home providers in England’, Ageing and Society, vol. 27, pp. 103–26.
Matosevic, T., Knapp, M. & Le Grand, J. 2008, ‘Motivation and commis-
sioning: Perceived and expressed motivations of care home providers’, 
Social Policy & Administration, vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 228–47.
McGrail, K. McGregor, M., Cohen, M., Tate, R. & Ronald, L. 2007, ‘For-
profi t versus not-for-profi t delivery of long-term care’, Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, vol. 176, no. 1, pp. 57–58.
McGregor, M., Tate, R., McGrail, K., Ronald, S., Broemeling, A. & Cohen, 
M. 2006, ‘Care outcomes in long-term care facilities in British Columbia, 
Canada: Does ownership matter?’ Medical Care, vol. 44, no. 10, pp. 929–35.
  Political economy of for-profit paid care  •  41
McGregor, M., Cohen, M., McGrail, K., Broemeling, A., Adler, M., 
Schulzer, M., Ronald, L. Cvitkovich, Y. & Beck, M. 2005, ‘Staffi  ng levels in 
not-for-profi t and for-profi t long-term care facilities: Does type of owner-
ship matter?’ Canadian Medical Association Journal, vol. 172, pp. 645–49.
Meagher, G. 2006, ‘What can we expect from paid carers?’ Politics and 
Society, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 33–54. 
Morris, J. 1999, ‘Market constraints on child care quality’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 563, pp. 130–45.
Morris, J. & Helburn, S. 2000, ‘Child care centre quality diff erences: Th e 
role of profi t status, client preferences, and trust’, Nonprofi t and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 377–99.
Nelson, J. 1999, ‘Of markets and martyrs: Is it OK to pay well for care?’ 
Feminist Economics, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 43–59. 
Nelson, J. & England, P. 2002, ‘Feminist philosophies of love and work’, 
Hypatia, vol. 17, no. 2., pp. 1–18.
Nelson, J. & Folbre, N. 2006, ‘Why a well-paid nurse is a better nurse’, 
Nurse Economics, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 127–30.
Pearson, M. & Martin, J. 2005, Should we extend the role of private social 
expenditure? OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 
23, OECD Publishing.
Perry 6. 1998, ‘Ownership and the new politics of the public interest ser-
vices’, Th e Political Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 404–14.
Press, F. & Woodrow, C. 2009, ‘Th e giant in the playground: Investigat-
ing the reach and implications of the corporatisation of childcare provi-
sion’, in Paid Care in Australia: Politics, Profi ts, Practices, eds D. King & G. 
Meagher, Sydney University Press, Sydney. 
Preston, A. 1993, ‘Effi  ciency, quality, and social externalities in the provi-
sion of day care: Comparisons of nonprofi t and for-profi t fi rms’, Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, vol. 4, nos 1–2, pp. 165–82.
Rush, E. 2007, ‘Employees’ views on quality’, in Kids Count: Better Early 
Childhood Education and Care in Australia, eds E. Hill, B. Pocock & A. 
Elliott, Sydney University Press, Sydney.
42  •  Meagher & Cortis
Salaman, L. 1999, ‘Th e nonprofi t sector at a crossroads: Th e case of Ameri-
ca’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofi t Organiza-
tions, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 5–23.
Schmid, H. 2001, ‘Nonprofi t organizations and for-profi t organizations 
providing home care services for the Israeli frail elderly: A comparative 
analysis’, International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 24, no. 11, pp. 
1233–65.
Schmid, H. & Nirel, R. 2004, ‘Ownership and age in nonprofi t and for-
profi t home care’, Administration in Social Work, vol. 28, no. 3–4, pp. 
183–200.
Scourfi eld, P. 2006, ‘“What matters is what works”? How discourses of 
modernization have both silenced and limited debate on domiciliary care 
for older people’, Critical Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 5–30.
Scourfi eld, P. 2007, ‘Are there reasons to be worried about the “carteliza-
tion” of residential care?’ Critical Social Policy, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 155–80.
Stone, D. 2005, ‘For love nor money: Th e commodifi cation of care’, in Re-
thinking Commodifi cation: Cases and Readings in Law and Culture, eds M. 
Ertman & J. Williams, New York University Press, New York, pp. 271–90.
Tuominen, M. 1991, ‘Caring for profi t: Th e social, economic and political 
signifi cance of for-profi t child care’, Social Service Review, vol. 65, no. 3, 
pp. 450–67.
Ungerson, C. 1997, ‘Social politics and the commodifi cation of care’, Social 
Politics, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 362–81. 
Wærness, K. 1984, ‘Th e rationality of caring’, Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 185–211.
